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forthcoming in Notre Dame Philosophical Review (2014)
Christopher Janaway & Simon Robertson (eds.), Nietzsche, Naturalism & Normativity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
Reviewed by Brian Leiter, University of Chicago
December 26, 2013

This volume comprises nine new essays, primarily on various topics in Nietzsche’s ethics,
especially his critique of morality, meta-ethics and moral psychology; only one essay primarily concerns
the meaning of “naturalism.” The contributors include, besides the editors, several well-known figures
in Anglophone Nietzsche studies: R. Lanier Anderson, Nadeem Hussain, Peter Poellner, Bernard
Reginster, and Richard Schacht. Of perhaps special interest is that the volume features two essays by
well-known moral philosophers, Peter Railton and Alan Thomas, neither of whom has written on
Nietzsche previously. Almost all the essays (with an exception to be noted) are written to a high
standard of scholarly care and philosophical argumentation, and can be read profitably by philosophers
not primarily interested in Nietzsche. The volume as a whole is certainly essential for Nietzsche
scholars, and some of the essays will interest moral philosophers more generally.
The essays can be grouped into three main areas. First, when Nietzsche critiques morality, what
is his target and how can his critique (and his naturalism) be squared with his own evaluative views
(Railton, Robertson)? Call this, following my terminology (Leiter 2002: 74-77, which Robertson
explicitly adopts), “the Scope Problem.” Second, several essays (Hussain, Poellner, Thomas) address
metaethical questions, in particular, what the metaphysical and semantic status and character of
Nietzsche’s own evaluative judgments are supposed to be? Third, three other authors (Anderson,
Janaway, Reginster) examine aspects of Nietzsche’s moral psychology, particularly his conception of
human agency, motivation, and the self. Finally, Schacht is the only author to focus exclusively on the
question of what Nietzsche’s naturalism amounts to; unfortunately, his is the weakest essay in the
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volume. I will return to it briefly at the end in order to focus first on the more philosophically serious
pieces.
Let us begin with the “Scope Problem.” Simon Robertson’s meticulous paper takes up the
challenge of how “to separate the object of [Nietzsche’s] critique [of morality] from [Nietzsche’s]
positive ideal,” and in such a way that the positive ideal is not vulnerable to the same objections
Nietzsche lodges against morality (p. 81). He fairly canvasses various accounts in the literature—by
Clark, Foot, myself, and Williams—but then focuses on my account (Leiter 2002: 78 ff.), which he
basically accepts, but proposing one interesting emendation. I had proposed that Nietzsche’s target in
critiquing morality (“morality in the pejorative sense” or MPS) were systems of value that (1)
presupposed particular descriptive claims about human agency and/or (2) embodied normative
commitments harmful to those Nietzsche views as higher human beings. Robertson challenges my
account of the descriptive component, arguing that any account of (1) would be more
“theoretically…satisfying” if it explains why MPS harms higher human beings, per the complaint in (2) (p.
91). Robertson’s very interesting idea is that, in addition to contesting presuppositions about agency,
Nietzsche also “conceives of morality as embodying a commitment to objectivity, such that…there are
objective moral facts, truths and value…[and] morality is normatively authoritative in that compliance
with it is categorically required…and morality is universal in its juridiction” (p. 92). I had tried to capture
the last part with the idea that part of the descriptive component of MPS was the (false) idea that agents
are sufficiently similar in terms of their interests that “one moral code is appropriate for all” (Leiter
2002: 80). Robertson argues that morality’s claim to be “normatively authoritative” (one’s moral
obligations do not depends on one’s antecedent motivations, roughly [93]) makes better sense of what
we both agree on—that Nietzsche thinks MPS claims “universal” applicability—than my alternative (9899). In particular, he claims that my view that MPS treats all agents as sufficient similar that one
morality is appropriate for all of them is just “surplus to the explanation of how morality’s claim to
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universality” (99) affects everyone, even those harmed by it. On Robertson’s account, then, one of the
crucial presuppositions of MPS is that it claims a universal jurisdiction, but not as a matter of descriptive
claims about human agency, but as a kind of brute “metaphysics” of morality. One interpretive question
that will now arise is on what basis Nietzsche rejects it. Robertson goes on to explore how this revision
of my account also allows us to appreciate points developed by Clark and Williams and come to a more
satisfactory answer to the Scope Problem.
Railton is interested in the “scope problem,” but also the challenge that Nietzsche’s naturalism
poses for the idea of normativity. He is pleasingly clear about the latter:
Where in the portrait of the natural world and its laws, and of the human organism and its
physio-chemical nature, does one find anything corresponding to free will as we understand it?
Or to autonomy—the capacity to be governed by reason according to principles we impose
upon ourselves, not merely dominated by causal laws and lacking ultimate responsibility for our
actions?
….[D]oesn’t such thorough-going naturalism also threaten Nietzsche’s positive view?
For isn’t he making recommendations of his own, pointing to reasons to reject the “strange
simplification and falsification man lives” in acting “for the good” or “for God” [citing Beyond
Good and Evil, 24]….What becomes of the possibility of normative action-guidance—of acting
for a reason rather than simply as a result of causal forces? (22-23)
Railton does not explicitly consider the possibility that this kind of normativity and “acting for a reason”
disappears, even if we continue to “talk the talk” of reasons for action. He, instead, crafts a richly
evocative account of how a serious naturalist who rejects free will and autonomy could nonetheless
aspire to normativity, to providing “reasons” for action.
With respect to the “scope problem,” Railton proposes a fruitful distinction between “normative
concepts proper” which are basically “directive” (concepts such as “rule, norm, standard, law, right,

wrong, correct, incorrect….”) (25) and “evaluative concepts” (like “good, bad, noble, base, fine,
magnificent…detestable, lovable, hateful, beautiful, ugly, sublime, disgusting, amusing….”) which are not
(25). He then distinguishes four dimensions along which these two kinds of concepts differ: fit,
voluntariness, continuity, and exclusiveness (26). Briefly: (1) with regard to “fit,” normative concepts
either require or exclude certain conduct, while evaluative concepts emphasize “realizing or
harmonizing with a ‘nature,’ telos, end or purposes” (26); (2) with regard to voluntariness, normative
concepts suppose that “ought implies can,” while evaluative concepts mainly apply to “non-voluntary
states, attitudes or motivations as well as acts” (26); (3) with regard to continuity, normative concepts
(unsurprisingly, given the fit requirement) are “typically binary….as conditions that must be met” (26),
that is, they either are satisfied or not, while normative concepts “can be realized to greater or lesser
degrees” (26); finally (4) normative concepts can not abide “practical contradictions” (either you must
do it or not!), while conflicting evaluative concepts “can coexist and be promoted in a single act, event,
object, or individual” (26).
Railton assumes that Nietzsche’s attack on freedom and autonomy undermines the sense of the
normative concepts, but not the evaluative concepts, which seems right to me. (Railton also allows,
crucially, in a footnote [p. 26 n. 7] that normative concepts are acceptable if “embedded” in the
evaluative concepts.) Railton’s strategy then is to introduce increasingly complex portraits of
individuals whose actions satisfy the evaluative concepts (e.g., a skilled mariner navigating a storm [31]
and an aesthete experiencing a painting at a museum [35]), portraits which we are to imagine viewing
“from the inside,” as it were, so that we come to appreciate the skills made manifest, and thus can see
how “normative force operates less by argument or reasoning than by inspiring admiration and
apprecation” (46). If that is all that “reasons for action” amounts to, then the account does seem
compatible with Nietzsche’s, since “reasons for action” in this context appears to mean nothing more
than “causes inspiration and emulation.”

Two of the three essays on broadly meta-ethical themes are concerned primarily with issues
about the semantics of moral judgment. Hussain argues, convincingly to my mind, against the
anachronistic reading of Nietzsche as a “non-cognitivist” in Clark & Dudrick (2007). Thomas, conversely,
argues against Hussain’s “fictionalist” reading as adequate to explain Nietzsche’s revaluation of values,
and suggests, instead, that we would do well (with a nod to Langsam [1997]) to explore the idea that
Nietzsche is a kind of subjective realist about value, though one who makes room for “a reflective
acknowledgment of the role of the subject in placing conditions on value” (154). Anyone working on the
most plausible semantics of moral judgment to ascribe to Nietzsche will benefit from these two
sophisticated engagements with the issues.
Since I am skeptical—partly for reasons Hussain and Thomas, perhaps uintnentionally, illustrate
with their careful attention to what Nietzsche says--that Nietzsche’s texts settle any interesting question
about the semantics of normative judgment (Leiter 2000; Hussain appears now to agree: cf. his 2013:
412), I will focus instead on the Poellner essay, “Aestheticist Ethics,” which presents a rich and
challenging view of the metaphysics of value according to Nietzsche. Poellner uses two passages from
Nietzsche to illustrate what he calls Nietzsche’s “aestheticist style of evaluation” (57). One (58) is
Nietzsche’s appraisal of Wagner’s Meistersinger, which I quote in part:
Now it seems archaic, now strange, acid and too young, it is as arbitrary as it is pompoustraditional, it is not infrequently puckish, still more often rough and uncouth—it has fire and
spirit and at the same time the loose yellow skin of fruits which ripen too late. It flows broad
and full: and suddendly a moment of inexplicable hesitation…an oppression producing dreams,
almost a nightmare—but already the old stream of well-being, of happiness old and new, very
much including the well-being of the artist himself. (Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 240)
On Poellner’s rendering, Nietzsche’s evaluation of the music “concern[s] mostly its expressive
properties” (60), that is, properties that express actual or possible mental states. Nietzsche’s response

to the music, Poellner says, is “more adequately characterized as a direct (non-inferential) experience, a
perception, of certain sensory phenomena as suitable or appropiate for the expression of certain mental
states” (59). Notice that the claim that the experience is one of certain phenomena “as suitable or
appropriate” for expressing mental states is added by Poellner; nothing in the passage, as far as I can
see, requires it. Undoubtedly, Nietzsche describes his experience of the music as expressing these
properties: but where is the experience of suitability or appropriateness? It can not simply be that
Nietzsche so describes the music, since that is equally compatible with denying the claim about
suitability.
Poellner wants to import a kind of aesthetic realism (of a surprisingly Kantian kind) into his
reading of Nietzsche. Poellner says, plausibly (and consistent with Nietzsche’s view, I believe), that in an
aesthetic experience the “awareness of certain phenomenal properties of the object…includes or
motivates an affective response to the object” (61). To this, Poellner adds, without additional textual
evidence from Nietzsche, that “an aesthetic experience presents its object as having an autonomous
value” (61). “Autonomous” is, however, ambiguous, and Poellner’s gloss on it may not be inconsistent
with Nietzsche’s writing: “The affective component of the experience is motivated by what the
phenomenal object itself is, not by what it may be instrumentally good for” (61). None of this yet gets
us the surprising idea that the aesthetic experience of the object represents it as “suitable” or
“appropriate” for expressing the mental states it expresses. Bear in mind that Nietzsche clearly views
aesthetic experience and pleasure as on a continuum with sexual experience and pleasure (see, e.g., the
Third Essay of the Genealogy, sections 6 and 9., but also section 4 of the “What I Owe to the Ancients”
chapter of Twilgith of the Idols). That Bruce finds a naked woman sexually arousing does not mean that
he is committed to believing that naked women ought to command such a response, nor does it mean
that his pleasurable arousal is only a matter of the instrumental value of naked women. We need clear
textual evidence that Nietzsche thinks aesthetic experience is different.

Poellner’s thesis that for Nietzsche the “grounds” of “ethical” value judgments “are ultimately
located in experiences which are aeshetic” (62) is an attractive one, but what renders Poellner’s view
distinctive, and to my mind less plausible, is what he says about aesthetic value. On the one hand, as
we have seen, Poellner views aesthetic experiences as affective, but he has a very particular (and, in my
view, unNietzschean) cognitivist view of affects:
[A]ffective experiences are essentially intentional or representational….Affective experience
represents these objects under value aspects; grief represents an event as sad (in a specific
way), indignation as unjust or immoral, disgust represents its object as nauesous, sexual desire
as physically attractive, “aesthetic” contemplative pleasure as beautiful or perhaps
harmonious…. [Thus] in saying that some affects represent putative features of ojects, we are
saying that, being intentional, they have conditions of success. My grief or horror or fear may
turn out to have been misplaced, inappropriate, to have misrepresented the object. (63, 64)
In his radical cognitivism about the emotions, Poellner has, I believe, gone beyond anything that
Nietzsche’s texts would warrant. We can agree, for example, that affective experiences have
intentional objects (if I’m afraid, I’m [typically] afraid of something!), without agreeing that such
experiences “represent[] these objects under value aspects”: the death of a loved one may cause my
grief—an affect which has as its object his death—but that does not mean my feeling “represents” his
death “as sad”: it just means that I feel sad about his death. But Poellner needs a stronger claim, since
he wants to say that my emotions, “in being intentional…have conditions of success” (64), that is, my
grief could be false, because the death is not, in fact, sad. Poellner asserts that the “bodily sensations”
of fear, for example, are caused by the representation of what is fearful, rather than being the cause of
the feeling (64), but this is empircally false (Prinz 2007: 56-60). Poellner sometimes cites Peter Goldie,
but Goldie warned us, correctly, against stripping the feeling out of emotions, even if they have
intentional objects (he proposed instead a primitve mental state, ‘feeling towards,’ to capture what is at

stake). Poellner is always philosophically well-informed and intelligent, but I am not persuaded that the
texts support the view he articulates, and I am also not persuaded that it represents the most promising
view of emotions.
Of the three essays on moral psychology, Anderson’s and Janaway’s are most explicitly
concerned with reconciling normativity and Nietzsche’s naturalism. Anderson usefully focuses the issue
by considering what kind of “self” the naturalist can recognize, contrasting that account with the kind a
Kantian might endorse. On the naturalist view I defend, which Anderson succinctly describes, “what
speaks for ‘the self’ is nothing but the strongest or dominant drive” (205). Anderson, reasonably, uses
Gardner 2009, as the Kantian foil, and identifies some apt naturalist rejoinders (206). Anderson,
however, wants to defend what he thinks of as an intermediate view: “the Nietzschean self is not
simply given as standard metaphysical equipment in every human, but is rather some kind of task or
achievement” (208). And the crucial claim is that this kind of self “is separable from its constituent
attitudes, in the sense of having the capacity to stand back from them to assess them, endorse them or
reject them, ‘control’, and ‘dispose of’ them [quoting Nietzsche]” (2101-11), and thus has a kind of
“autonomy.”
Anderson proceeds mainly by focusing on one passage, Beyond Good and Evil, section 12. (He
allows that “some texts and notes in Nietzsche do suggest the sort of stronger [psychologistic] reduction
or elimination of the self that” he denies is found in this passage [211 n. 17], but thinks these other
passages “are hyperbolic and do not reflect Nietzsche’s considered position” [id.].) Anderson
emphasizes (2012-13) that Nietzsche’s target in this passage is psychological atomism, meaning that
“every drive or affect is [also] open to analysis that would reveal a complex internal structure composed
of further drive- or affect-shaped substructures” (214). But this is not quite what the passage says: the
passage says soul atomism is the doctrine that “the soul is something indestructible, eternal, indivisible,
that it is a monad.” This would be compatible Nietzsche thinking of drives (rather than the soul) as

explanatory of the self—something Anderson denies, even though Nietzsche specifically mentions in the
passage at issue the idea of the self as “social structure of the drives and affects,” making the latter
sound like “atoms” in the sense Anderson’s Nietzsche allegedly rejects. Part of the difficulty here, I
think, is that Anderson does not realize the passage’s target (the “clumsy naturalist[]”) is clearly Ludwig
Büchner’s Kraft und Stoff, in particular, its embrace of eliminative materialism (indeed, later in the book
[sec. 204], Nietzsche specifically casts aspersions on “old doctors,” meaning Büchner, who was a
physician by training and well on in years by then). By contrast, Nietzsche is, of course, committed to
the reality of psychological phenomena—psychology is, after all, to be restored as “the queen of the
sciences” as he says at the end of the first chapter of Beyond Good and Evil—and so his opponent is not
the kind of Humean that Anderson opposes, but an actual eliminativist about the mental. I am inclined
to think that Nietzsche does reject both eliminativism and physical reductionism about the
psychological, but neither is at stake for the kind of skeptical view of the self that Nietzsche holds, which
requires the autonomy of the psychological as an explanatory realm.
Janaway, in a carefully argued essay, takes up the question: what is the relationship between
being able to affirm the eternal return of one’s life, the idea of a “great” human being, and Nietzsche’s
philosophical psychology, in particular, his account of the role of drives? Janaway correctly notes that
Nietzsche’s actual formulations of the idea of eternal return (for example, in Gay Science, section 341
and Beyond Good and Evil, section 56) do “not…say how one ought to live” (184), rather they say that “it
would show you were well-disposed to yourself to the highest degree possible” if you could affirm the
eternal return, and thus Nietzsche is simply “trying to describe what it would be to be this ideal type of
individual” (184). Janaway, like Railton, wonders whether such an ideal could really have “no normative
implications?” (184). That may depend, of course, on what great human beings are like, and so here
Janaway turns to what Nietzsche says about philosophical psychology. He largely follows the account of
drives in Katsafanas (2013), though with a slight modification, that need not concern us here: “a drive is

a relatively enduring disposition of which the agent may be ignorant, but which, even when the agent
has some awareness of it, operates in a mannter outside the agent’s full rational or conscious control,
and which disposes the agent to evaluate things in ways that give rise to certain kinds of behavior”
(187). Janaway thinks that drives “are not necessarily immutable givens of human nature,” and are
“responsive to modification by cultural means” (189). His evidence is ambiguous, especially on the first
point, though it seems right that drives can be modified on the Nietzschean picture (and the Freudian
one, which Nietzsche influenced): they can be repressed, sublimated, weakened, strengthened and so
on. The crucial claim is that, for Nietzsche, the “highest human being” will have “a multiplicity of
conflicting but unified” drives (191), a point which seems true to Nietzsche’s rhetoric but not very
illuminating otherwise.
Janaway’s central question, however, is how to understand the relationship between the idea
that “one is great because one is, to a high degree, positively disposed towards oneself” (i.e., willing to
will the eternal return of one’s life) and the idea that “human greatness has as its condition certain
internal properties and relations of drives that pertain whether one knows ir ot not” (192). Let us call
the first “the Eternal Return Criterion” and the latter the “Internal Coherence Criterion” (these are my
terms, not Janaway’s). Both criteria have textual support in Nietzsche, and Janaway’s question is about
their connection. He notes (192) John Richardson’s view that, essentially, the Internal Coherence
Criterion must be satisfied in order for the Eternal Return Criterion to be satisfied (no one can will the
eternal return unless they are already internally coherent): thus Internal Coherence is primary.
Janaway, by contrast, defends the view that affirming the eternal return “might in addition cause
alterations to our drives and their relations to one another in a such a way as to move them nearer to”
satisfying the Internal Coherence Criterion (195).

That could be true, and yet it might still be the case

that the ability to begin willing the eternal return is, itself, causally determined by a certain
psychological condition the agent is already in. Nothing Janaway says rules out that possibility, thus it is

possible that willing the eternal return may have a causal influence on achieving internal coherence, but
the fact that is true of any agent may simply be antecedently determined by other psycho-physical facts
about the person.
Reginster’s contribution has nothing to say about naturalism, and is focused squarely on an
interpretive issue. Reginster wants to understand why, exactly, Nietzsche thought that
“compassion…fosters selflessness, understood as a kind of self-devaluation” (160) and, more precisely,
why Nietzsche thinks “selflessness” is “actually incompatible” with altruism (or compassion) (161). The
key, Reginster argues, is to understand how Schopenhauer thought about altruism, and, to that end, he
offers a skillful and illuminating account of Schopenhauer’s treatment of the “problem of altruism”
(162). For Schopenhauer, the egoist “cares only about his own interests because he fails to recognize or
appreciate fully the reality of others with interests of their own” (163). Egoism is unsurprising, since
“follow[ing] in a venerable Cartesian tradition,” Schopenhauer supposes that it follows from the “special
‘immediate’ or ‘direct’ knowledge [that I have] of myself” (164) and thus “the personal significance my
interests have for me is ultimately nothing more than an effect of my epistemic proximity to them; that
is to say, a kind of illusion” (166). The challenge, then, for the possibility of compassion is how one can
“have as direct an acquaintance with the interests of others as I have with my own” (166). The most
common answer is that failure of compassion is a result of being “duped by the illusion of individuation”
(167), though Reginster identifies some difficulties with one way of understanding that claim (167-169).
He argues, instead, that for Schopenhauer, “compassion rests on a dissolution of the boundaries of
individuation: it is not that I mistakenly take others to be part of me [which would simply make altruism
a kind of egoism], it is rather that there is no me and them any longer” (170). It is not, then, that I come
to identify with others—that still presupposes “me and them”—but that I lose all sense of a distinction
between me and them. When I am conscious of my self, I am conscious of my will (or willing), and thus,
to no longer experience one’s self—“selflessness”—would “designate[] a certain kind of experience, in

which an individual loses his sense of self to become absorbed in the pure contemplation of a world in
which he has lost all interest” (173).
On Reginster’s telling, Nietzsche’s crucial objection to Schopenhauer is that this kind of
“selfless” person can not really manifest alturistic concern for another, since “[a]ll that remains, and all
that matters, in this perspective, is suffering….[I]t matter not at all that it is located in this or that region
of time and space: his sole concern is with de-individuated suffering” (179). By contrast, a genuine
altruist has to have a sense of the difference between “me” and “them,” and has to take seriously the
idea that interests count simply because they are “mine” or “theirs”: the real altruist would then act for
the sake of the interests of others, recognizing them as important just because they are their interests
(180-181).
What, finally, of the “naturalism” advertised in the volume’s title? Several of the essays simply
take for granted my account of Nietzsche’s naturalism (Leiter 2002), though the editors in their useful
introduction, unsurprisingly, rehearse some of Janaway’s earlier criticisms of that account (Janaway
2007), though without noting the ways in which these criticisms involved confusions about or
misrepresentations of my position (cf. Leiter 2013 and my earlier review of Janaway [2007] for NDPR).
As an alternative, the editors invoke a rather superficial essay on Nietzsche by Bernard Williams (1995),
which is notable mainly for its lack of precision about what naturalism means. (Had it not been written
by a “famous” philosopher, I doubt anyone would still be discussing this superficial essay some two
decades later.) Thus, the editors write that Nietzsche “attempts to interpret human experiences in a
way that is ‘consistent with…our understanding of humans as part of nature’” (6, quoting Williams 1995:
67). “Consistency” is a very weak constraint on theorizing, but even so, its meaning is unclear without
an account of what “part of nature” means. Hegel, after all, had an account of humans as “part of
nature” as he understood nature, but he is not (one hopes) a naturalist. All that Williams offers (which
the editors again quote [6]) is the stricture that we should prefer explanatory “account[s] that rest only

on conceptions that we use anyway elsewhere” (1995: 68). “Anyway elsewhere,” I take it, means that
we should prefer causal explanations that rely on mechanisms identifies by the sciences in other domain
and that invoke properties that are explanatorily consilient, in the sense that they make sense of others
features of the world (for this way of understanding naturalism, see Leiter 2001, 2013). Why the
editors think this is an improvement over the “methodological naturalism” I attribute to Nietzsche is, I
confess, mysterious.1
The one essay in the volume to take up the topic of naturalism explicitly, by Schacht, is also,
unfortunately, the least satisfying in the book. Schacht begins by giving a fair summary of my view of
Nietzsche’s methodological naturalism (p. 238): Leiter “characterizes the ‘methodological doctrine’ as
the view that ‘philosophical inquiry should be continuous with the sciences’ [Leiter 2002: 3]; that is,
“continous with the sciences either in virtue of their dependence upon the actual results of scientific
method in different domains or in virtue of their employment and emulation of distinctively scientific
ways of looking at and explaining things [Leiter 2002: 5, emphases added].” Despite quoting me
accurately, Schacht immediately and persistently mischaracterizes this as meaning natural science (24)
or “scientistically reductionist” (242). Yet my account of Nietzsche’s naturalism is explicit that Nietzsche
“aims to offer theories that explain various important human phenomena (especially the phenomon of
morality), and [to] do so in ways that both draw on actual scientific results, particularly in physiology…,
but are also modeled [speculatively] on science in the sense that they seek to reveal the causal
determinants of these phenomena, typically in varoius physiological and psychological facts about
persons” (Leiter 2002: 8, emphasis added). Schacht apparently does not understand that a naturalistic
explanation, modelled on the sciences, does not have to be a reductive materialist explanation, which

1

The editors also repeatedly confuse what their friends in the south of England think with the state of
scholarly debate, pronouncing various interpretive lines (basically Janaway’s) as what “many” take to be the case
(6) or what is allegedly “the more common interpretative line” (7 n. 3). Philosophy “by head count” is neither
satisfying, nor interesting.

Schacht points out (citing Gay Science 373) Nietzsche rejected (241). Unnoted by Schacht is that I
adduced the exact same passage (Leiter 2002: 25) to make the same point, namely, that Nietzsche is
not a reductive materialist/naturalist. If one claims Nietzsche (or Hume or Spinoza or Quine) is a
naturalist, one has to offer some account of naturalism. Schacht purports to reject mine (even while
making a hash of it), and then offers in its stead vague pronouncements like Nietzsche’s naturalism “is
attentive and attuned to the full panoply…of our human reality and world, and it is determined to make
sense of both its richness and its emergence” (241) and that it “involves employing and drawing upon a
multiplicity of differing perspectives, ‘optics’ and sensibilities in its interpretive attempt to broaden and
deepen our understanding of ourselves” (242). One might reasonably ask who is not a “naturalist” on
this strange rendering?
On the understanding of Nietzsche’s naturalism, then, this volume offers little of interest: the
explicit discussions are either fleeting or vacuous. But in terms of thinking about his metaethics, his
moral psychology, and his critique of morality and normativity, within a broadly naturalistic framework,
the volume is an excellent contribution to the secondary literature, and several of the essays will I
expect become widely discussed in the secondary literature.
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